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INTRODUCTION
This case involves the applicability of the statute of limitations and the doctrine of
after-acquired title to the State of Utah when acting as trustee under the state school trust
land grant. In 1905, the State sold a 640 acre section of school trust land (the "Subject
Land") to a private corporation, the Carbon County Land Company ("CCLC"), for
nominal consideration. The United States subsequently successfully sued the State in
1924 to invalidate the State's title to the Subject Land on the basis that the lands were of
known mineral character at the time of statehood, and thus not subject to transfer. With
title to the land having never left the United States, the State of Utah's 1905 sale to
CCLC, and the 1912 state patent effecting conveyance of the land, were both void ab
initio.
By subsequent federal legislation known as the Jones Act, Act of Jan. 25, 1927,
ch. 57 § 1, 44 Stat. 1026, codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 870-871 (the "Jones Act"),
the United States conveyed title to the Subject Land to the State of Utah, effective
January 25, 1927. In 1932, Carbon County purported to sell CCLC's interest in the land
for back taxes, and the Appellees' (collectively the "Mathises") predecessor acquired that
interest from the County by quitclaim deed in 1938. [R. 307, 478]. The State learned in
2002 that the Mathises were leasing the lands to a third party for coal extraction and
subsequently filed this action. [R. 604].
The substantive question presented to the District Court was whether the State of
Utah's after-acquired title in the mineral estate of the Subject Land flowed to CCLC - the
State's patentee under the void 1912 patent - when the State first acquired the land from
1

the United States on January 25, 1927. The State contends that as a matter of law the
void 1912 state patent could not support a claim of after-acquired title, and that the
Mathises did not have the required privity in any event to assert such a claim, given the
root of their claims in a tax sale. Without after-acquired title, the tax sale upon which the
Mathises' claim to title is based was unquestionably void, since title to the Subject Land
had always been in either the United States or the State, and the property was thus
exempt from taxation.
The parties did not dispute relevant facts concerning the original sale of the
Subject Property, the United States' invalidation of the State's title, the Jones Act, and
the subsequent Carbon County tax sale. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the
District Court held that the statute of limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2
(2007) barred the State from maintaining this action. This appeal followed.
I.
The Supreme Court's Holding in Van Wagoner v.
Whitmore Remains Applicable - Limitations May Not Be
Applied to Divest Utah's School Trust of Real Property.

A.

Introduction.
In Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 199 P. 670 (Utah 1921) ("Van Wagoner"), the Utah

Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations contained in Section 6446 of the
Compiled Laws of 1917 - a statute substantively identical to Section 78-12-2 — could not
constitutionally be applied to prevent the State from suing to recover real property for the
benefit of Utah's school trust. The Court specifically held that the Utah Constitution's
2

directive that school trust lands be disposed of "as may be provided by law for the
respective purposes for which they have been granted" placed an absolute limitation on
the power of the state to dispose of the lands except for the purpose for which they were
granted, i.e. support of Utah's public schools. 199 P. at 675-676. In light of this
limitation, it found that "the conclusion becomes irresistible that the statutes of limitation
have no application to the land in question...." even if the statute by its terms applied to
the state. Id; see also State v. Peterson, 97 P. 2d 603 (Idaho 1939); United States v.
Fenton, 27 F.Supp. 816, 817 (D. Idaho 1939)("The [school] fund is sacred and stands out
with that special protection, and any statute of limitations, whether it relates to the State
or not, would not apply to actions brought by the trustee State....") (emphasis added).
The Mathises make two arguments in support of ignoring Van Wagoner and
applying Section 78-12-2 to the school trust in this action. First, they claim that the more
recent decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Trail Mountain Coal Company v. Utah
Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 884 P.2d 1265 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), affd 921 P.2d 1365
(Utah 1996) (Trail Mountain"), in which the statute of limitations was applied in an
action to collect underpaid coal royalties, supersedes Van Wagoner. Mathis Brief at 1519. Second, they claim that applying Van Wagoner would give the State a blank check to
challenge any past transaction, however distant, if the State did not receive full value at
the time of the original transaction. Mathis Brief at 19. The Mathises' first argument is
incorrect because Trail Mountain is both factually and legally distinguishable from the
current case. Their second argument is a straw man; the State seeks here to quiet title to a

3

specific property that it has owned as a matter of law since 1927, not to reopen any past
transactions (including the undisputedly void sale to CCLC).
B.

Van Wagoner Remains Good Law, and Should Be Applied in this Case.
Defendants argue that Van Wagoner has been superseded by Trail Mountain Coal

Company v. Div. of State Lands & Forestry 884 P.2d 1265 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), affd
921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996). In Trail Mountain, the Utah Court of Appeals held that Utah
Code Ann. §78-12-2 was applicable to the State's claims for recovery of underpaid
mineral royalties. The Court of Appeals stated that although states are generally exempt
from limitations when acting as school trust lands trustees, there was an exception when
the legislature had made limitations applicable through statutes such as Section 78-12-2.
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the State of Utah failed to raise the constitutional
issue until its reply brief, and the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on the
basis of the State's waiver, without addressing the merits of the constitutional claim. 921
P. 2d at 1371, n. 11.
The Supreme Court need not and should not apply the Court of Appeals' decision
in Trail Mountain here. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands &
Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 524, n.14 (Utah 1994) ("This Court follows its own
precedents..." and is not bound by decisions of the Court of Appeals") (emphasis in
original). The Court of Appeals' relied on three cases, also cited by the Mathises in their
brief: California State Lands Comm 'n v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Cal.
1981); Laramie County Sch. Dist. v. Muirf 808 P. 2d 797, 800-01 (Wyo. 1991); and State
ex rel Cartwright v. Tidmore, 61A P. 2d 14 (Okla. 1983). None of these cases address or
4

analyze the issue now before the Court - the constitutional limits on the legislature's
ability to subject the State's school trust lands to a statute of limitations.1 None of the
three cases involves school trust lands or the constitutional issues associated with those
lands. The California State Lands case involved tidelands, which pass incidentally to
states at statehood rather than through the "solemn compact" associated with school trust
lands, and for which entirely different rules of law apply. The Supreme Court has
specifically distinguished such public trust lands from school trust lands, holding that
stricter trust principles govern the latter. National Parks and Conservation Association v.
Board of State Lands, 869 P. 2d 909, 919 (Utah 1993). Laramie County and Cartwright
did not involve lands at all; the former was a construction defect case brought by a school
district, while the latter was a state procurement case.
Utah's state constitutional provisions place substantive limits on the legislature's
ability to act with respect to school trust lands. Consolidation Coal Company v. Utah
Division of State Lands & Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 525 (Utah 1994) (the state has an
irrevocable duty to receive "full value" from any disposition of school trust lands). In
that case, the Supreme Court discussed the likely unconstitutionality of the state's
prejudgment interest statute as applied to the school trust:
Given that the Utah Enabling Act and state and federal constitutions
"unequivocally demand" that the trust fund be paid the full value of any

1

Pioneer Inv. & Trust Co. v. Board ofEduc. of Salt Lake City, 99 P. 150, 152 (Utah 1909)
is cited by the Mathises for the general rule that the legislature could make the statute of
limitations for the recovery of real property applicable as against the sovereign state. Van
Wagoner then imposed a constitutional limit on the application of the general rule to
school trust lands because of the constitutional nature of the school land grant.
5

minerals transferred from it, we have serious doubts that the application of
section 15-1-1 in this case would withstand constitutional scrutiny.
886 P. 2d at 527.
In Trail Mountain, the Court of Appeals did not analyze the distinction between
claims involving trust lands - where the legislature's power is constitutionally
constrained - and general government claims involving non-trust lands or other issues
where no such constraints exist. Having failed to address the critical constitutional issue
at all, the Court of Appeals opinion in Trail Mountain is of questionable precedential
value to the issue in this case.
Although the Supreme Court subsequently upheld the Court of Appeals' decision,
it did not consider the constitutional issue, because the State had failed to preserve the
issue for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on the basis of the
State's waiver of this issue, without addressing the merits. Trail Mountain Coal
Company v. Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 921 P. 2d 1365, 1371, n . l l (Utah 1996).
Van Wagoner remains good law. The Supreme Court has continued to cite the case in
support of school trust principles in the line of coal royalty cases that include Trail
Mountain. See Plateau Mining Co. v. Division of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720,
729 (Utah 1990). It should be applied to preclude application of Section 78-12-2 to the
State's claims here.
C.

The Mathises Misrepresent the Nature of the State's Claims.
The Mathises claim that the State wants the Court to declare that any time that the

State in hindsight believes it sold real property for less than full value, it is free to
6

challenge that conveyance, irrespective of the passage of time. Mathis Brief at 19. They
point to the difficulty in determining what the actual value of the Subject Land was when
the State purported to sell the property to the Carbon County Land Company in 1905. Id.
They further argue that, because the various audits and litigation establishing that CCLC
had actively defrauded the State and the United States in the acquisition of coal lands
were known to the State at the time, it could have litigated the issue at that time. Id. at
20-21. Finally, they make the contradictory claim that the audits and litigation did not
implicate the specific land at issue here, so there is no basis for thinking that the State
believed that fraud had taken place. Id.
The Mathises' claim that the State is seeking to reopen the 1905 transaction
misstates the agreed facts and the prior positions of both parties in this litigation. The
State is not seeking to revisit the 1905 transaction, although (as discussed in Sections III
and IV) it was marked by indicia of fraud. The undisputed facts are that the 1905 sale to
CCLC, and the 1912 patent issued in connection with that sale, were entirely void
because the State of Utah never had title to the Subject Land. See Shores v. State of
Utah 52 Pub. Lands Dec. 503, 1928 WL 3120 (D.O.I. 1928) (prior purchaser of Utah
state school section "obtained nothing" from pre-Jones Act purchase). This fact was
conclusively established by the Department of the Interior's final adjudication in 1926.
The State first obtained title to the Subject Land on January 25, 1927 pursuant to the
Jones Act. The Mathises claim that the doctrine of after-acquired title divested the State
of its title instantly as of that date in favor of CCLC, allowing what would otherwise be a
void tax sale of tax-exempt property to proceed. This is hardly a case where the State is
7

seeking to reopen a bad deal after the fact. Instead, this case involves the total divestment
of the land from the corpus of the school trust by claimed operation of law. Under Van
Wagoner, the statute of limitations may not be applied to prevent the state from
challenging the total divestiture of the state's interest in real property.2
II.
THE AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE DOCTRINE
IS NOT APPLICABLE HERE
A.

Introduction.
The Mathises argue that when the State acquired the Subject Land through the

federal Jones Act on January 25, 1927, full fee title to the Subject Property flowed
instantly to CCLC through the doctrine of estoppel by deed (as codified by the Utah
After-Acquired Title Act), even though both state and federal law at that time prohibited
the conveyance of the mineral estate out of state ownership. Under this theory, because
the State's after-acquired title vested in CCLC on January 25, 1927, the subsequent
December 21, 1927 Carbon County tax sale which is the basis of Defendants' title was
not void.
2

The Mathises seek to distinguish Van Wagoner on the basis that it was an adverse
possession case. The Van Wagoner situation - where limitations were being asserted to
divest the school trust of its entire ownership interest in a parcel - is similar to the case at
bar. In contract, Trail Mountain involved a suit by the State to collect back royalties
from a coal mine on state lands - essentially a common commercial dispute to collect
unpaid monies. The Van Wagoner court emphasized the Utah Constitution's directive
that the school trust lands be disposed of "as may be provided by law for the respective
purposes for which they have been granted". This placed an absolute limitation on the
power of the state to dispose of the lands except for the purpose for which they were
granted, i.e. support of Utah's public schools. 199 P. at 675-676. Limitations did not
apply where the State sought, as here, to prevent an unconstitutional disposition of title to
school trust lands. Id.
8

B.

After-Acquired Title Applies Only to the Grantee and Those in Privity with the
Grantee.
As a threshold matter, the Court need not consider the after-acquired title

arguments advanced by the Mathises, because they are not in privity of title with CCLC,
the grantee under the 1912 state patent. The Mathises' title arose solely from a tax sale
conducted by Carbon County. The doctrine of after-acquired title benefits only the
grantee and those in privity with him. Cox v. Gutman, 575 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App. Ct.
1978). It may not be invoked by a stranger to the original conveyance who is claiming
through an independent title. General Auto Service Station v. Maniatis, 765 N.E. 2d
1176, 1184 n. 4 (111. App. 1 Dist. 2002); Sampson v. U.S, 208 Ct. CI. 656, 529 F. 2d 1299,
1306 (Ct. CI. 1976) (estoppels by deed cannot be invoked by one who is neither party not
privy to the original deed); State v. Phillips, 400 A. 2d 299, 309 (Del. Ch. 1979)
(estoppels by deed is operative only between the parties and their privies; strangers to the
deed cannot invoke the estoppel). This principle follows from the general rule that a
party claiming the benefit of an estoppel must show he was induced to change his
position because of representations in the deed. Dominex, Inc. v. Key, 456 So. 2d 1047,
1057 (Al. 1984). The Utah Supreme Court has similarly held that reasonable reliance is a
necessary element of establishing estoppel by deed. Arnold Industries, Inc. v. Love, 63 P.
3d 721, 727, 2002 UT f 19 (2002).
There is no privity between a state's grantee and one who has acquired title
through a tax sale. Bradham v. United States, 168 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1948), citing
Hussman v. Durham, 165 U.S. 144 (1897). In Hussman, the U.S. Supreme Court
9

considered whether those claiming title through a void tax sale can assert any estoppel
against previous record owners, and found such a claim cannot stand because the tax sale
functions to break privity between the two lines of ownership. 165 U.S. at 149-50. The
Mathises argue that Hussman is factually inapposite to the case here. Mathis Brief at 4142. The slight difference in facts is not relevant to the key legal principle - that a tax sale
breaks privity. As stated by the Supreme Court:
[T]here is no privity between the holder of the fee and one
who claims a tax title upon the land. The latter title is not
derived from, but in antagonism to the former, The holder of
the [tax title] is not a privy in estate with the holder of the
former....
Further, so far as the money paid for taxes, it is familiar law
that a purchaser of a tax title takes all the chances.
165 U.S. at 149-50.
The Mathises, as a matter of law, are not in privity with CCLC. Their tax title is
independent of and antagonistic to CCLC's title, depriving them of the ability to assert
estoppel by deed. Nor can Defendants show reliance on representations in the patent, as
required by the Utah Supreme Court in Arnold Industries, Inc. v. Love, supra. Their
predecessor Rex Mathis was a stranger to CCLC's title, and could not have relied on it
when he bought a quitclaim deed from Carbon County in 1938, over a dozen years after
CCLC's title was adjudicated to be void.
C.

The 1912 State Patent Will Not Support an Estoppel By Deed.
Utah law is clear that a quitclaim deed will not support a subsequent estoppel by

deed against the grantor. The Mathises argue that a state patent granting a full fee estate,
10

although not containing a warranty, may be regarded as something more than a quitclaim
and thus estop the grantor from challenging grantee's title. Mathis Brief at 34-39. In
Kennedy Oil v. Lance Oil & Gas Co., 126 P. 3d 875 (Wyo. 2006), the Wyoming Supreme
Court held:
Estoppel by deed generally is based upon the covenants contained in a
warranty deed, and does not, therefore, arise from a conveyance via
quitclaim. This rule is not absolute, however, and despite being a quitclaim
in form, a conveyance may give rise to estoppel by deed when it "contains
language showing that the grantor intended to convey and the grantee
expected to acquire a particular estate." Alternatively stated, a "quitclaim
deed is one which purports to convey, and is understood to convey,
nothing more than the interest or estate in the property described of
which the grantor is seized or possessed, if any, at the time, rather than
the property itself."
126 P. 3d at 884 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted).
The highlighted language demonstrates the fatal flaw with Mathises' approach. If
the 1912 patent purported to convey, and was understood to convey, only whatever the
State had at the time, it is in legal effect a quitclaim, and estoppel by deed cannot apply.
It is black letter law that this is exactly what a state patent does. Corpus Juris
Secundum states with respect to the operation and effect of state patents:
A patent is not a deed of bargain and sale, but is merely in the nature of a
quitclaim deed, passing only such title as the state then has in the land. Its
legal effect is to transfer all right which the state possesses in land that it
describes, and no more.
CJ.S. Public Lands, § 273 (2006)(emphasis added).
Conveyance of only that interest that the grantor holds as of the date of
conveyance is the hallmark of a quitclaim deed under Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. §
57-1-14 (quitclaim deed has effect of conveyance of grantor's rights as of the date of the
11

conveyance). Where a conveyance only transfers that which a grantor has as of the date
of conveyance, after-acquired title will not accrue. Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 186 P.2d
965 (Utah 1947).
Because the operation of a patent is that of a quitclaim, it follows as a general rule
that patents are "without any covenants of warranty whatever; and it is clear also that the
doctrine of estoppel does not apply thereto so as to pass an after-acquired title." 63A
Am.Jur.2d, Public Lands, § 77, at 575 (1984). Courts have therefore concluded that a
state patent will not give rise to an estoppel by deed.

For example, in North Star

Terminal and Stevedore Co. v. State, 857 P. 2d 335 (Ak. 1993), the Supreme Court of
Alaska stated:
A patent operates as a deed of the government. "As a deed, its
operation is that of a quitclaim....It passes only the title the
government has ... on the date of the patent." It follows as a
general rule that government patents are "without any
covenants of warranty whatever; and it is clear also that the
doctrine of estoppels does not apply thereto so as to pass an
after-acquired title."

857 P. 2d at 340 (internal citations omitted). See also Ellingstad v. Alaska, 979 P.2d
1000, 1006 (Alaska 1999)3; Huntington v. Donovan, 192 P. 543, 547 (Cal. 1920) (Afteracquired title doctrine "does not apply to a government patent").

The Mathises attempt to distinguish Ellingstad because the plaintiff seeking to establish
after-acquired title had been issued a quitclaim deed rather than a patent. Mathis Brief at
35, n. 11. Nonetheless, the Ellingstad court directly stated the identical legal effect of
patents and quitclaim deed. More to the point, Ellingstad cited North Star v. State, supra,
which directly holds that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply to state patents to pass
an after-acquired title. 857 P. 2d at 340.
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The U.S. Department of the Interior has also formally opined that the rule of the
Huntington case (that after-acquired title does not apply to government patents) applies
also to States that obtain after-acquired title under the Jones Act. Margaret Scharf, 57
Int. Dec. 348, 365 fn 15, 1941 WL 4653 (DOI) (1941). In that case, the oil and gas lessee
of an original state patentee (i.e. a party in CCLC's shoes) acknowledged that if title had
passed under the Jones Act, the former state patentee had no rights to lease to him. 57
Int. Dec. At 353. The Department concurred. Id, fii 15.
In light of the law governing state patents, the 1912 patent as a matter of law did
not purport to convey, and could not be understood to convey, more than what the State
of Utah owned as of that date. This was law as of the date of the 1912 patent. Beard v.
Federy, 70 U.S. (3. Wall.) 478, 491, 18 L.Ed. 88 (1866); Los Angeles Farming & Milling
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 217 U.S. 217, 228 30 S.Ct. 452, 457 (1910) (patent's
operation is that of a quitclaim, or, rather, a conveyance of such interest as the
government may possess). It remains so today. See North Star Terminal, supra, 857 P.
2d at 340. The doctrine of after-acquired title simply does not apply to prior conveyances
by state patent.
D.

The Cases Cited By the Mathises Are Distinguishable.
The cases cited by Defendants for the proposition that states may be subject to

estoppel by deed are easily distinguished on their facts. For example, State v. Mobile, 78
So. 47, 48 (Ala. 1918) involved specific statutory authority for estoppel by deed. It
distinguished cases where "a patent from the state is in the nature of a quitclaim merely,
and passes only such title as the state then has . . . " (the situation in this case), saying:
13

"Those cases, however, do not deal with patents . . . under the influence of a statute like
ours, and they are therefore not on point". Wolcott v. Des Moines Nav. & RR. Co., 72
U.S. 681, 687 (1866), stated without analysis that its conclusion was based on
unspecified Iowa law. Daniel v. Sherrill, 48 So. 2d 736, 740 (Fla. 1950); Crosbie v.
Partridge, 205 P. 758 (Okla. 1922); and State v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 98 S.E.
214 (W.Va. 1919) did not involve conveyances by patent. In contrast to these minimal
precedents, the authorities cited above clearly establish that a state patent will not serve
as the basis for after-acquired title. See e.g. North Star Terminal and Stevedore
Company, supra.
E.

Language in the 1912 Patent Cited By Defendants Is Not Relevant.
The Mathises rely upon language in the 1912 patent providing that land was

granted and confirmed to CCLC and its heirs and assigns forever, subject to existing
encumbrances, as indicia of intent to convey an estate that would support a later estoppel
by deed. Mathis Brief at 37. This language is legally irrelevant in light of the law
expressly governing state patents, set forth above. It is also irrelevant because the real
touchstone of the doctrine of after-acquired title is not the nature of the estate,4 but the
warranty of title a grantor promises to a grantee. Barlow Soc 'y v. Commercial Sec. Bank,
723 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah 1986); United Oklahoma Bank v. Moss, 793 P.2d 1359, 1362
(Okla. 1990). A warranty must appear "on the face of the instrument," where the grantor

4

Suggesting conveyance of fee simple is the touchstone for applying the after-acquired
title doctrine is illogical, since fee simple can be quitclaimed or warranted. Master
Laboratories v. Chesnut, 49 N.W.2d 693, 696-97 (Neb. 1951); Roberts v. Rhodes 643
P.2dll6(Kan. 1982).
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"recites . . . that he is seized or possessed of a particular estate which the deed purports to
convey." R.E.H., Annotation, Nature of Conveyance or Covenants Which Will Create
Estoppel to Assert After-Acquired Title or Interest in Real Property, Necessity for
Warranty of Title, III 58 A.L.R. 345 (2006); see also Wall v. Utah Copper Co., 277 F. 55
(8th Cir. 1921).
The Mathises emphasize certain words and phrases in the 1912 patent, but none of
them indicate the State warrants its title in the estate granted. The 1912 patent does not
use the terms "convey" and "warrant", the generally accepted means to warrant title,
historically and now by Utah statute. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12. Both statutory forms
of quitclaim and warranty deed use the terms grant, grantor and grantee. The use of the
phrase "successors and assigns forever" is no more than the habendum clause of the
conveyance defining the term of the estate, ensuring that an inheritable and alienable
estate is passed. It does not indicate a warranty of title. 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 36. The
phrase "all of Section 36" by no means indicates a warranty, since the parties would be in
the same dispute if the patent had granted "half of Section 36" with the hypothetical half
containing the minerals presently under contention. The size of the ground cannot be
construed to be a warranty, merely a description. Lastly, words of limitation in a
quitclaim deed ("subject to") do not give rise to a warranty as to the rest of the estate. M.
C Dixon Lumber Co., Inc. v. Mathison, 266 So.2d 841, 850 (Ala. 1972). Rather, parties
may freely choose to expressly limit an estate whether passed by quitclaim or warranty
deed. Defendants cite Hancock v. Planned Development Corporation, 791 P.2d 183
(Utah 1990) and Pruitt v. Meadows, 393 So.2d 986 (Ala. 1981) for the proposition that
15

"subject to" language in a deed implies it is a warranty deed. The Court should note that
both Hancock and Pruitt both involved actual warranty deeds, so such language is
irrelevant as to its effect in the case at bar where no such express warranty exists. 791
P.2datl85;393So.2dat987.
F.

After-Acquired Title Could Not Pass in Derogation of the Utah Constitution,
Utah Statutes Requiring the Reservation of Minerals, and Federal Law.
Where a constitutional limitation on the conveyance of state mineral estate exists,

the state may not be estopped from attacking a patent purporting to convey the mineral
estate. Lewis v. State, 156 So.2d431, 434 (La. 1963). Title to the Subject Land first
vested in the State of Utah through the Jones Act, as confirmed by an uncontested formal
decision by the Department of the Interior in 1929. [R. 295-299]. As of the date that the
Mathises claim CCLC's after-acquired title accrued - January 25, 1927 — the Utah
Enabling Act, the Jones Act, the Utah Constitution, and Utah statutory law5 all prohibited
disposition of the mineral estate. The Utah Enabling Act imposed a federal limitation on
the State of Utah's ability to dispose of lands granted under it in derogation of the best
interests of the school trust. ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989); Branson
School Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998). The Jones Act expressly
conditioned its grant to the states on the requirement that any conveyances by the states
reserve the entire mineral estate. These federal law limitations directly limited the ability
of the Utah legislature to divest trust assets, including by operation of law through
5

L. Utah 1919, Ch. 107, § 5575 provided: "... the purchaser of any land belonging to
the State shall acquire no right, title or interest in and to such deposits, and the right
of the purchaser shall be subject to the reservation of all coal and other mineral
deposits.../' (emphasis added).
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doctrines such as estoppel by deed, a point well made by the Department of the Interior
legal opinion (lis* uv<n| III limi im \t sa linn
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Constitution, which imposes an "absolute limitation" on the power of the state to disp< »sc
of school trust lands except for the benefit of the school trust. Plateau Mining Co, i
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obtaining full value for these lands. Id. In the face of both federal law and state law
prohibiting the uncompensated passage of title to the mineral estate out of the school
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law fHiiiiiiiiiij' iii alii ir ,iu i,|imi <i uiuvestoppel h\ deed could not apply.
III.

NEITHER THE STATE'S ALLEGED "CHANGE OF POSITION"
NOR THE 1932 AMENDMENT TO THE JONES ACT
FVANT TO TWF STATE'S MAINTENANCE OF THIS ACTION

A.
Defendants Have Made No Effective Legal Arguments Based on the State's
Alleged Change of Position.

1 1 ic; Mathises devote substantial space in their Brief to the State's purported
change of position between a July 1.7, 1929 letter froi n State I and Board secretary J I

6

Spratling v. State Land Board, 437 P. 2d 886 (Utah 1968), cited by the Mathises at page
33 of their Brief, differs from this case in a key respect. Spratling involved a pre-1919
sale that did not reserve minerals, and a 1920 patent that similarly did not reserve
minerals. The Court held that the State could not subsequently attack the patent on the
basis of the patent's failure to reserve the mineral estate. However, in Spratling, there
was no break in the grantee's chain of title. Here, the original sale was void ab initio.
The Mathises seek to revive a void patent as of 1927 and claim an estate that federal and
state law existing as of that date required to remain with the state. In addition, there was
clear privity of title in Spratling, a fact not available to the Mathises.
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Oldroyd, in which Mr. Oldroyd suggests that after-acquired title may apply, and the
current litigation, in which the State contends that after-acquired title did not pass to
CCLC by virtue of the 1912 patent. Mathis Brief at 26, 28. While the State believes that
these contentions are misconceived, as set forth below, the Court should note that
Mathises have raised no direct legal or equitable claims that relate to the purported
change of position. The doctrines of after-acquired title and estoppel by deed hinge upon
two legal issues: the Mathises' (nonexistent) privity with CCLC, and the legal effect of
the 1912 patent at the time that it was issued. That a state official may have opined
(incorrectly, in light of applicable law) fifteen years later that after-acquired title
appeared to apply to a class of past sales has no legal effect. There was certainly no
reliance on this opinion by CCLC; the Subject Land had been sold to Carbon County for
taxes 18 months earlier. Statements such as the Oldroyd letter are legally meaningless.
See Plateau Resources, supra, 802 P. 2d 728 (school trust may not be estopped by prior
inconsistent comments). If the conveyance of public mineral estate is not permissible by
law, the contrary acts of government officers do not bind the government, and the
government is free to assert title notwithstanding the passage of time. United States v.
Carbon County Land Company, 46 F. 2d. 980, 987 (10th Cir. 1931), affdsub nom State
of Utah v. United States, 284 U.S. 534, 52 S. Ct 232 (1932).
B.

DOI's 1930 Reply to the State Land Board Correctly Stated the Law.
The Mathises place substantial reliance throughout their brief on a letter sent to the

Department of the Interior by State Land Board Executive Secretary J.T. Oldroyd on July
17, 1929. [R. 660-662]; Mathis Brief 6-7, 29. The Oldroyd letter noted the existence of
18

Ihr 1' 'Inh ;i(kT-iia|tiii'\\l tillt \1.tliiU:, anil, questioning its applicability, asked foi the
Department's legal opinion. In response to the July 17, 1929 Oldroyd letter, Assistant
Secretary of the Interior John H. Edwards responded by letter dated January 15, 1930.
11
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1 l\li hdwards responded directly to Mr. Oldroyd5 s suggestions that after-
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vested in the state:
[T]he purchasers thereof obtained nothing by their purchase prior to the act,
and if disposal of the coal deposits in such lands is not made in accordance
with the terms of [the Jones Act], recommendations to the Attorney General
to institute forfeiture proceedings would be warranted. Shores v. State of
Utah, et al (52 L.D. 504, 507). The title asserted by purchase under State
patents for such lands would necessarily be void. Ivanhoe Mining Co. v.
Keystone Consol Min. Co. (102 U.S. 167, 176); Hermocilla v. Hubbell et
al (89 Cal. 5 26 Pac. 611); Nevada Exploration & Mining Co. v. Spriggs,
(411 Jtahl78, 1 24 Pac 772).

[R. 774j. Mr. Edwards then made several further conclusions aboi it **

^,nu

expressed in the Oldroyd letter. First, he cited three U.S. Supreme Court decisions
holding that Congress' grant of school lands to the states to be a grant in trust for the
designated pmpusi
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otherwise, to either alienate mineral title or consider its previous conveyances as
alienations. Second, he noted that the Jones Act conveyed only a conditional fee to the
States vui 1II ni i p n s s i h i l i k i i f R n n l n i (n | | u I Inilcd K\ lies; ill Ihr s t u t c s (|t<! u n l t u i n p l N i.s • 111

the conditions of the grant. Therefore, the State of Utah did not have an absolute
unrestricted title, and could not grant an absolute title to its purchasers. Finally, he noted
\\] \\ v\vt\ A\ iqitittji aitfuciuio \\h i lUius*!'.'! contentions about 1 lie Utah law of at'ter-
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acquired title, the purchasers could not obtain title greater than the grantor against whom
the estoppel is claimed.
The Mathises have cited no case law that suggests that the Department of the
Interior's position, as expressed in Assistant Secretary Edwards' letter, was not an
accurate statement of federal law. The Edwards letter simply shredded the rationale
expressed in Mr. Oldroyd's letter for the possible application of the doctrine of afteracquired title. The state had no power, as a trustee for the benefit of the schools, to divest
the mineral estate; it had a restricted title; and a purchaser could not obtain more than the
state's limited title even if estoppel by deed were applicable.8
C.

The 1932 Amendment to the Jones Act Did Not Salvage After-Acquired Title.
The Mathises rely heavily on the 1932 amendment to the Jones Act, Act of May 2,

1932, ch. 151, Sec. 1, 47 Stat. 140 (the "1932 Amendment"). They argue that this
amendment retroactively eliminated the requirement under the Jones Act that minerals be
reserved to the state under risk of forfeiture where the states had transferred the lands out
of state ownership prior to January 25, 1927. The clear legislative history of the 1932

7

In Margaret Scharf, supra, the Department opined that the after-acquired title of the
states under the Jones Act did not inure to their patentees. 57 Int .Dec. 365, fn. 15.
8

Although the Mathises argue, without citation to authority, that the Jones Act did not
effect a severance of the mineral estate, it is impossible to read Assistant Secretary
Edwards' legal opinion without reaching the conclusion that the Act did sever the estates,
given that his conclusion that the State's title did not contain the right to convey minerals.
In light of the restricted estate of the State, the 1927 tax sale could in no event reach the
minerals even if the balance of the property had passed through an estoppel to CCLC.
See Bilby v. Wire, 11 N.W.2d 882, 884-6 (N.D. 1956).
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\ ii le ndment si lppoi ts the opposite conclusion.9 For example, the 1932 Amendment's
House sponsor Utah representative Dun 1 niton, engaged in (lit1 follow lift: tliahviit1 villi .1
colleague about the impact of the amendment:
Mr. STAFFORD. As I read the act, it has a retroactive effect.
Mr. COLTON. No. Section (b) that we seek to amend will clarify this point. It is
possible without this amendment that lands disposed of by the State prior to 1927 would
be affected, and this provides where the State has heretofore disposed of this land the
provision of section (b) would be amended or modified.
Mr. STAFFORD. Has the gentleman any idea as to the amount of acreage that will be
affected by this act?
Mr. COLTON. It would be very difficult to say because it is only on school sections
affected. The law granting the lands to States provides that the minerals must be kept by
the State for a perpetual school fund.
Mr. STAFFORD. There is no possibility iif'itii) i,oii(1irl 111 lights developing as a result
of this act?
Mr. COLTON. No.
Mr. STAFFORD. Take the case cited by the gentleman where the school section
lands have been transferred. What rights would the States have under that
condition?
Mr. COLTON. The State would sell the land or lease n
iiey must reserve to the
State for the benefit of the schools all of the minerals.

75 Cong. Rec. 8,416 (1932) (statement of Rep. Colton) (emphasis added).

9

The Mathises also rely on an April 24, 1930 letter from the State Land Board's
geologist, Edward H. Burdick, to the Land Board, referencing Assistant Secretary
Edwards' letter. [R. 703-708]; Mathis Brief at 28, fn. 7. They point out that Mr. Burdick
suggests that the state pursue federal legislation to quiet title in the states to lands sold
prior to the Jones Act, and argue that the 1932 Amendment effectuates this suggestion.
They fail to quote the last part of his suggestion, which notes that any legislation to quiet
title would need to contain "certain exceptions, as in the latter legislation [the 1927 Jones
Act]. Mr. Burdick goes on to point out that of all state lands, lands similar to the Subject
Land that had been adjudicated to have been mineral and reverted to the United States
were a clear case where no uncertainty of title existed. Mr. Burdick's statements directly
correlate with Representative Colton's testimony, described above, that such lands would
still require a mineral reservation after the 1932 Amendment.
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This dialogue specifically rebuts the Mathises' contention that: (1) the 1932
amendment could retroactively bring back to life a title that had been adjudicated to be
void;10 and (2) that there was Congressional intent to free previously-adjudicated lands
from the requirement that minerals be reserved.11
Even assuming arguendo that the 1932 Amendment freed the Subject Lands from
the restrictions of the Jones Act, other federal and state law would prohibit the passage of
title to the mineral estate underlying the Subject Lands through an estoppel. As discussed
in Section I above, the Utah Enabling Act imposed direct federal law limitations on the
ability of the states to dispose of trust assets for less than full value. The Subject Land
had been adjudicated as of 1927 as known to be valuable for minerals. The Utah
Constitution forbade disposition of trust assets by operation of law where full value was
not obtained. Plateau, supra, 802 P. 2d at 728-729. Utah statute similarly forbade
conveyance of minerals. Conveyance of the mineral estate through after-acquired title
could not legally occur, whatever the interpretation of the 1932 amendment.
IV.
NO EQUITABLE BASIS EXISTS
FOR DENYING RECOVERY OF THE MINERAL
ESTATE BY THE SCHOOL TRUST

1U

Mr. STAFFORD. As I read the act, it has a retroactive effect. Mr. COLTON. No.

11

Mr. STAFFORD. Take the case cited by the gentleman where the school section
lands have been transferred. What rights would the States have under that
condition?
Mr. COLTON. The State would sell the land or lease it but they must reserve to the
State for the benefit of the schools all of the minerals, (emphasis added).
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4

The Court Should Consider the Historic Context of the Carbon County Land
Company and the State's Actions at the Time.
The Mathises rely heavily on the State's ostensible change in position between the

1929 Oldroyd letter (where the State Land Board mentioned the after-acquired title
statute) and the State's current position. The Oldroyd letter sought a legal opinion. Both

7 7 7] and the legal arguments set forth above establish that after-acquired title does not
apply. Even if the Oldroyd letter were a clear statement of position, prior statements
cannot estop the State from recovering full vali le foi 1:1 le scl 100I ti i ist

I Hateai /, supi a,

802 P 2< 11 it 728- 729.
The Supreme Court should take judicial notice of the historic background relevant
to this case. The historic record of the first twenty years of Utah's statehood reveals the
Mia/esslhtll i/diul

»( ( '( I I ' and nils j >i it icipals, acting it IC oncert < > i."1:1: i Ilk1 iiegla, ( (or a!

worst the connivance) of Utah state officials, t o rob U t a h ' s school trust and the United
States of vast tracts of valuable coal lands. C C L C was found by multiple courts to have
committed fraud in the acquisition of Utah coal lands, and the same courts noted the
active participation of state officials in these schemes. United States v. Carbon
Land Company,

County

4 6 F. 2d. 980, 987 (10 t h Cir. 1931), affd sub nom State of Utah v. United

States, 284 I J .S. 534, 52 S. C t. 232 (1.932); see also Nancy J. I aniguchi, Necessary
Fraud: Progressive Reform and Utah Coal ( I Ji ill 'ersity c >f Okla 1996) at 225-230
(discussing state official involvement with CCLC transactions found later to be
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fraudulent).

A special investigation conducted on behalf of Governor Bamberger

previously identified the 1912 sale of the Subject Land to CCLC as part of a larger group
sold without adequate consideration and bearing the indicia of fraud. The Mathises
obviously were not a party to the fraud, since their predecessor, Rex Mathis, acquired the
land by virtue of a subsequent tax sale. Their claim to the mineral estate rests, however,
on the Court enforcing the equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed in favor of an entity CCLC - that clearly had unclean hands. Given its choice of awarding a windfall to a tax
sale purchaser, or restoring to Utah's school trust a valuable asset wrongly taken from it,
the Court should choose the latter.13
B.

Allowing the State to Prevail Will Affect Only a Limited Class of Titles.
The Mathises argue that allowing the State to pursue this action will place titles to

"hundreds if not thousands of tracts of land" in legal uncertainty. Mathis Brief at 30.
This claim is incorrect. This case pertains to the limited class of lands that were: (1) sold
prior to 1919 by the State; (2) formally adjudicated by the Department of the Interior
12

The Mathises correctly note that Milner v. United States, 228 F. 431 (8 th Cir. 1915) did
not involve the specific lands here. Mathis Brief at 20, fn 3. Milner involved CCLC's
principals' use of state land selection rights to defraud the U.S. After the finding of
fraud, the State and CCLC undertook a complex scheme to deprive the United States of
recovery of the lands. It took almost 15 years of further litigation by the United States —
in which the State's support of CCLC's fraud was noted by the courts - to recover the
lands. See 46 F.2d at 986. It was during this time period that the State Land Board raised
the possibility of after-acquired title here.
13

The Mathises' predecessor paid $417 for a quitclaim deed to the Subject Land based on
a tax sale. The State has already discussed the Mathises' lack of privity with CCLC.
There could have been no reliance by them on the 1912 patent's ostensible conveyance of
the mineral estate when Rex Mathis obtained his quitclaim deed 26 years later. There is
no equitable basis for denying the State's claim to the mineral estate - the purchaser of a
tax title "takes all the chances".
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prior to January 25, 1927 to have not passed to the State; and (3) have not been re-deeded
to the State. This pool is tiny. The State's research indicated that 11 parcels may fit this
description, and four of those involved CCLC. [R924]. Factual situations and potential
defenses not

'ere - for example, clain is of bona t ide pi irchaser statt is

coi ild

limit the pool further, as will the fact that many of the coal lands taken from the school
trust in its earlier years were fully exploited and now are essentially valueless. In short,
the Court need not fear

disruption of titles if it rules in favor ofthe State.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court should reverse the District Court's holding, vacate the order below,
-emand this action with instructions to enter summary judgment for the State.
Respectfully submitted this / V day of August, 2008.

Thomas &mitm&y$3&7
Special Assistant Attorney General for
State of Utah, School & Institutional
Trust Lands Administration
675 East 500 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)538-5100
Facsimile: (801)538-5118
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ADDENDUM

C-O-P-Y

DBP^RTMEMT Of THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON
1347678 "L"

Mr* J# !?• Mendenhall,
Executive Secretary,
State' Land Board,
Salt Lake C:l ty.

JHU , lt>

hW.

Effect of land grant of January
25, 1927 (44 Stat. 1026), upon
titles theretofore granted by the
State to lands within the purview
of the grant.

My dear Mr. Mendenhall:
Reference is made to the letter of the State Land Board of
Utah, dated July 17, 1929, addressed to ike Commissioner of the
General Land Office, requesting the construction of the Department
of the act of January 25, 1927 (44 Stat* 1086), as to its effect
lands affected by the act, which lands had been sold to them by the
State absolutely and without mineral reservation prior to the passage
of said act*
The letter adverts to the fact that thousands of acres of State
lands had been sold, and that thereafter with knowledge of such sales
the Depariaaent had held in a number of such instances, that the lands
so sold, were known to be valuable for mineral at the time the
State's rights would have otherwise attached under its original
grant (act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat* 107), and therefore did not
pass-under its original grant, and it is stated that parties interested in SSate lands "request an expression of the Department, in
order that these parties can feel secure in their title and in the
development that they may desire to undertake..."
The Department's attention is invited to section 4879 oi una
Compiled Laws of Utah (1917) which provides:
If any person shall hereafter convey any real estate by conveyance purporting to convey the same in fee simple absolute, and
shall not at the time of conveyance have the legal estate in such real estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the legal estate subsequently
acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee, his heirs, successors, of
assigns, and such conveyance shall be as valid as if such legal estate had
been in the grantor at the time of the conveyance*
And to a statement in Report No. 1761 of the House of Reprefioii Lot lives on Senate Bill No. 564,69 th Congress, which reads:
The bill al3 0 requires the States to reserve and to withhold
emselves all minerals of whatsoever character, in any and all

000773
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2 lands which they shall hereafter transfer or sell, giving to them,
however, the right to lease the minerals in the lands and to utilize
the proceeds received as rentals or royalties for the benefit of
their common public schools.
The language in the act and report above quoted is cited as
supporting the view expressed in the letter that any title acquired
by the State of Utah under the act of January 25, 1927, vests in
the Statefs prior grantee, and that subsection (b) of aaid act
"applies only to sales and transfers after the passage of the act,
and does not affect grants where the title passes from the State
by vittue of its prior patent."
She provisions of subsection (b) are as follows:
The additional grant made by this act is upon the express condition that all sales, grants, deeds or patents for any of the
lands so granted shall be subject to and contain a reservation to
the Starts ~or all the xzmi anJ otfier minerals in the lands so sold,
granted, deeded or patented, together with the right to prospect
for, mine and remove the same, 'fhe coal and other mineral deposits
in such lands shall be subject to lease by the State as the State
legislature may direct, the proceeds of rentals and royalties therefrom to be utilized for the support or in aid of the common or
public schools: Provided, that any lands or minerals disposed of
contrary to the provisions of this act shall be forfeited to the
United States by appropriate proceedings instituted by the Attorney
General for that purpose in the united States District Court for
the district in which ihe property or some part thereof is located.
Obviously, where title did in fact pass from the State by
virtue of its prior patent, which would only be in instances where
the lands involved passed to the State under its original grant, the
act of January 25, 1927, does not affect such lands and sales and
conveyances of the same. This would be true under long settled
rules of the Department as to lands in fact mineral in character,
which had been sold and patented as lands passing under the original
grant, if the lands were not known to be mineral at the time they
were identified by survey, or at the time when the State was admitted to the union, if the survey preceded the admission•
As to lands, however, that m fact were known to be mineral
in character at the date the State's rights would have otherwise
attached, and which by reason of such knowledge did not pass under
/j
the original grant, the lands pass to the State only by virtue of
the act of January 25, 1927, and the purchasers thereof obtained
\
nothing by their purchase prior to the act, and if disposal of the
coal deposits in such lands is not made in accordance with tne terms—^
of the latter act, recommendations to the Attorney General to institute
forfeiture procaedmgs would be warranted. Louts A. Lawyer v. State of
Utah, United States Intervener, decided by the Department June 6, 1928
(unreported); Shores v. State of Utah et al. (52 L.D. 504, 507).
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The title asserted by purchase under State patents for such
lands would be necessarily void. Ivanhoe Mining Co+ v# Keystone
Consol, Mint Go. (102 U.S. 167, 176); Hermooilla v« Hubbell et al«
(89 Cal 5 36 Pac* 611); Nevada Exploration & Mining Co, v.Spriggs
(41 Utah 178f 124 Pac, 772^
Nothing has been presented that warrants any change from the
views above expressed.
The act of 1927 makes no exception from the operation of its
provisions lands theretofore sold, conveyed or patented by the
j
State, and certainly there is no room for the construction that it
j
;
validated the unauthorized prior sale of known mineral lands. Subsection (b) authorizes sales, grants, deeds or patents for the
lands so granted upon the express condition of a reservation of
the minerals to the State. The minerals are to be retained by the
State for a particular public purpose to use the revenues derived
therefrom for the support, or in aid of, public schools, and a
JSJllfiJ^^
jai^a^y^ 4* sf^eiti^d, towit, by lease providing for rents and royalties, and power is conferred on the Attorney General to institute appropriate proceedings to forfeit the grant in the event "any lands or minerals are
disposed of contrary to its provisions*" Under the construction
placed by the United States Supreme Court on grants to a State for
particular public purposes,^.see United States v, Michigan (190 U*S.
379, 3981; Ashburner v. California (103 U«S» 575); Brylgn y# United
States (851 U.S* 41); 25 K.C.L. 389, it is believed the grant in
question created a trust in the States by implication to tease
the minerals and use the rents and royalties therefrom for the bene- ^
fit of ther-public schools, so that the State by legislation or otherwise has no power to alienate its title to mineral deposits or consider its previous conveyances of such minerals as alienations, and
if they shall ever be diverted from the use expressed in the grant
|
in any respect, the United States may be called upon to determine
]
whether proceedings shall be instituted in some appropriate form to '\J
enforce the forfeiture provided for upon breach of the conditions of the grant.
The effect attributed in the State Land Board's letter to Sec.
4879 Comp* Laws of Utah, in that it would operate to invest the title
to the minerals granted to the State under the act of 1927 in prior
purchasers who obtained a contract to purchase, certificate, or patent
purporting to grant an absolute fee simple title, is not perceived by the
department* The grant under the act of 1927 has been held by the Department in the Lawyer and Shores cases to pass but a conditional fee title with
a possibility of reverter to the united States in the event that the State
fails to observe the conditions of the grant, and as above observed, a
title in trust for certain specified public uses and purposes. As the
additional grants of 1927 did not invest the States with an absolute unrestricted title to the minerals in the lands granted, the State has, therefore, not acquired such an estate as it purported to grant to its purchasers*
This being so, conceding arguendo, that the State dealt with such purchasers
in its proprietary capacity, that the Statute mentioned applies to transfers
by the State of its lands, that the patents or other muniments of title
issued by the State would not be void because there were in contraventioit oI!
r
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- 4 a then existing policy of Congress to except mineral lands from such grants,
and that the other requisites ordinarily creating an estoppel by deed are
present, nevertheless, as one who relies upon an estoppel for an after-acquired title can have no greater right than the grantor against whom the estoppel
is claimed (see Estoppel, 21 C.J., Sec, 39), it is difficult to perceive what
avail this statute would be to transferees asserting title by estoppel to
the minerals under its terms, putting aside any question of the repugnancy
of such a contention with the terms of subsection (b) of the grant*
The rule in the Utah statute quoted has been held as in no manner conflicting with any statute of the United States, and consistent
with well settled principles of equity, net chum v. Pleasant Valley
Coal Co* (257 Fed. 274), and no conflict is perceived between such
statute and the State's grant of 1927 as construed by the Department.
Neither does it seem necessary to imply from the above-quoted
laiguage from the report of the public lands committee of the House
of Representatives, that the committee regarded the mineral lands in
the odd-numbered school sections that were excepted from the grant
and e&ES&eously sold by the Stata aa not t&aj^aaftyar Aub4&ct to sale
under the conditions and restrictions of the grant of 1927•
But whatever may have been the thought of the committee, the
Department is unable to find warrant for interpolating unto the grant
of 1927 an intent to confirm the titles granted by the State to
lands expressly excepted from its original grant by reason of their
known mineral character and deprive the public schools of the State
of the benefits of the act in favor of such purchasers#
The objection to the view above expressed, that the necessity
~cotErtinues of having a determination made in the case of every section
sold by the State prior to 1919 without mineral reservation, of
whether or not the land was known mineral land at the time the State's
rights under the original grant would have attached in the absence of
loiown mineral character, must be answered with the statement that the
grant of 1937 does not appear to have removed that necessity.
The duties and responsibilities that devolve upon the State,
under the additional grant of 1927, and its effect on the functions
theretofore exercised by the Department in the administration of the
original grant of sections in place, and the degree of concern that
the Department has in the State's disposition of lands affected by
the additional grant, received consideration in the Lawyer case above
cited, and the following is quoted therefrom in conclusion:
So far as adjudications affecting title ars concerned, it is
well settled that the functions of the Land Department necessarily cease
when title has passed from the Government, ^oore v. Rob bins, 96 U.S.
530, 533; grasha^ v # O'Connor, 115 U.S. 102; State of California v.
Boddy., 0 L#D« 6S6; Reld v. State of Mississippi, 30 L.D. 230, 835.
Nor have the offi 0ers o f tile Department jurisdiction to review transactions between the State and its purchasers or the State and its
locating agents ^ ^ determine whether such purchasers and locating
agents comply with the provisions of its laws relating to the sale of
the landt g r a q j ^ v. 0*Connor, supra. Furthermore, it is plain that
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... 5 .under the provisions of paragraph, (b) of said act the question whether
the S t a t e complies with the express conditions thereof in reserving
to i t s e l f the mineral deposits granted under said act and disposing
of them only under l e a s e s , i s a matter for adjudication in the
Federal courts in proceedings brought by the Attorney General 0 I t
follows t h a t any determination that the Department might make as to
whether t h e lands did or did not pass under the o r i g i n a l grant, would
not bind or control the S t a t e f s discretion in considering whether
i t s disposition of the coal deposits on t h i s t r a c t was lawful by a
sale as land passing under the original grant, or would be lawful
only in the manner provided in the additional grant.
Nevertheless, as there is an important d i s t i n c t i o n in the
nature of two grants, the former being an absolute fee and the l a t t e r
contingent upon the performance of a condition subsequent with a
p o s s i b i l i t y of reversion of t i t l e to the grantor upon f a i l u r e to
comply with such condition, and as i t always has been one of the
f r a c t i o n s of t!m.l£M..Jisti^1mmi.
.to isifcs r^a0aiii^ua.toMons to the
properly and invalidly disposed of and to recover lands where the
t i t l e s are subject to f o r f e i t u r e for breaches of conditions in g r a n t s ,
i t i s deemed advisable to set forth herein the conclusions of t h e
Department as to whether the State obtained t i t l e under the o r i g i n a l
grjaat which inured to intervener or whether the t i t l e passed only
under the additional grant, rendering any attempted d i s p o s i t i o n by
the S t a t e prior thereto void and of no effect*
1 erj t n i ] j j 0 .1 r s ,
(Signed) J 1 til m hi * Edwa rds
Assistant S e c r e t a r y .
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